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The Project of Law, Moderation, and the
Global Constitution
KAROL EDWARD SOLTAN†
_______________________

I. INTRODUCTION
The title of my panel at the conference from which this paper
derives was ―The Future of Global Legal Regulation.‖ But neither I
nor anyone else can predict a future that will be created by human
beings and subject to the unpredictable effects of fortuna, as we
would say if we were living in Renaissance Italy. The future,
including the global legal future, will be also (in part) created by us,
our children, and their children. I do not propose to predict the new
things that will be created in the future. It would be depressing if we
could do that. Let us attempt instead to talk about ongoing projects of
human creative power, especially big, complex, and attractive
projects, really worthy of our support, our loyalties, and our
sacrifices.
One such project is the project of global law, which is nothing
more than the project of law understood in an ambitious way. Law is
one of the great projects of human creative power, and hence one of
the great projects of human civilization. Law can be seen as an
established practice, or it can be seen as a project. To see it as a
project is to attempt to understand it in a manner of a co-creator, not
simply a user or a spectator.
Perhaps surprisingly, this way of looking at law is not
† Associate Professor, Department of Government and Politics, University of
Maryland, College Park.
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commonplace. But it was one of the distinctive features of Lon
Fuller’s legal theory,1 and (being an immense fan of Fuller) this is
where I would like to start. Law for Fuller is the enterprise of
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.2 Law is an
enterprise, a project. Thus far I go with Fuller. But it is a more
complex enterprise, related to its context in more interesting ways. It
can and should be presented in its biggest and most attractive form.
The purpose of law, then, is not to subject human conduct to the
governance of rules. And it is not to establish or promote the rule of
law or to establish justice. It is, I would say, to articulate the impartial
and attractive principles of a complex, moderate, and universal
civilization. That civilization will be the fruit and manifestation of
human creative power. It will be engaged in a battle against human
destructive capacity. The purpose of law is to articulate those
principles in a manner that is usable by both courts and the allies of
courts in this struggle.
I sketch in this paper a view of law as an ambitious project, part of
an even larger political and cultural project, whose culmination is a
global constitution that forms the legal basis for a universal, complex,
and modern civilization. The paper cannot stand on its own, for it is
part of a larger effort to articulate a theory of civic moderation.3 But I
will try to make it stand on its own as much as possible.
There are both intellectual and practical advantages of looking at
law as a project, an ambitious project, and as part of an even larger
political and cultural project. The practical advantage is that it can
1. See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969);
WILLEM WITTEVEEN & WIBREN VAN DER BURG, REDISCOVERING FULLER (1999).
2. FULLER, supra note 1, at 106.
3. For more on my efforts to develop an ambitious conception of moderation,
see Karol Edward Sołtan, Constitution Making at the Edges of Constitutional
Order, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1409 (2007); Karol Edward Sołtan, Constitutional
Patriotism and Militant Moderation, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 96, 99–101 (2008); Karol
Edward Sołtan, Mature Democracy and Global Solidarity, in GLOBAL DEMOCRACY
AND ITS D IFFICULTIES 17, 17–34 (Anthony Langlois & Karol Edward Sołtan eds.,
2009). This conception of moderation is my contribution to the effort to develop an
intellectual community committed to ―civic studies.‖ For my earlier effort to
identify what we eventually called civic studies, see Karol Edward Sołtan, Selznick
and Civics, in LEGALITY AND COMMUNITY 357, 357–72 (Robert Kagan et al. eds.,
2002). This idea is a continuation and elaboration of the project of new
constitutionalism. See generally A NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM: DESIGNING
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FOR A GOOD SOCIETY (Stephen Elkin & Karol Edward
Sołtan eds., 1993).

SOLTAN (DO NOT DELETE)

232

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/27/2010 2:56 PM

[Vol. 25:230

and should help us contribute to the project. The intellectual
advantage is that it gives our understanding of law a distinctive form
of generality and depth, consistent with an overall view of human
beings as creators, not playthings of causal forces, and hence as
engaged in multiple small and large projects. Arguably, each action is
a small project, and so are the project of a global constitution and the
most inclusive project of all, the project of universal civilization, a
vast mosaic of projects and of products of those projects.
A project, Wikipedia tells us (and no more sophisticated source is
needed here), is a ―temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique
product, service or result.‖4 Alternatively, according to that other
global authority, the Wiktionary, it is ―a planned endeavor, usually
with a specific goal and accomplished in several steps or stages.‖5 We
can think of it as the basic element of the work of human creative
power. It is what human creation on the large scale is divided into.
To see law as a project is to see it as movement along a path. The
current state of the law is just a time slice, and not necessarily a
coherent one. It contains elements of the past and of the starting
point. But it contains also elements of various imaginable, more or
less attractive, futures. Its legitimacy depends less on its
contemporary coherence than on the capacity it exhibits to move
toward some attractive end.
Some clarification is needed. We would be well served by
distinguishing three kinds of accounts of the law. The first type are
accounts of law meant for judges and constrained by what judges
properly do. This differs in detail between legal systems and styles of
judging. But courts resolve disputes and in general are reluctant to go
beyond what is necessary to resolve those disputes. Moreover, judges
are supposed to be constrained by the text of the law, when there is
such a text, authoritatively determined outside the courts. One is
tempted to say this is an account of law as it is. But that is
misleading, without a long discussion of Dworkin.6 In any case, it is
an account in which interpretation and dispute resolution are crucial.
4. Wikipedia, Project, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project (last visited Apr. 7,
2010).
5. Wiktionary, Project, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Project (last visited Apr. 7,
2010).
6. For the most elaborate account, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE
(1986). For a good overview in an introductory text, see ANDREW ALTMAN,
ARGUING ABOUT LAW (2d ed. 2001).
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The second account of law consists of a normative theory of what
law ought to be. This is really not an account of law but more nearly
a political philosophy: utilitarianism and Rawls’s theory of justice
would be among the most familiar examples.7 It need pay no attention
to what judges do or to the current (or the past) practice of law.
In between these two is the third type of account, an account of law
as a project. It is given a rough sketch in the last chapter of
Dworkin’s Law’s Empire.8 But it is marginal in Dworkin’s theory,
which is centrally an account of law for the judges.
Tushnet has famously argued that we should take seriously the
Constitution outside the courts (the U.S. Constitution, in his case).9
This is to see the Constitution as a project. Indeed, Tushnet suggests a
thin account of the Constitution to serve as the centerpiece of this
project. It is ―a law oriented to realizing the principles of the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution’s Preamble. More
specifically it is a law committed to the principle of human rights
justifiable by reason in the service of self-government.‖10
We can generalize the idea, and work to develop a thin account of
the global constitution to put at the center of the project of law,
understood as something to be pursued in courts but also outside
courts. To be pursued by whom and how? Tushnet suggests the
responsibility for law be distributed broadly among the people and
adopts for himself the populist label.11 It is more in line with the
project of law and the project of a global constitution (as well as the
U.S. Constitution) to be more institutionally specific. The most
7. For a good overview of utilitarianism, see generally WILL KYMLICKA,
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 9–49 (1990). The most prominent
contemporary utilitarian is Peter Singer. See PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS
(1979). For further reading on Rawls’ main works, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (Harvard University Press 1972) (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE]; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996) [hereinafter RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. For a later restatement, see JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (2001) [hereinafter, RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS].
8. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 400–13.
9. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999).
10. Id. at 181.
11. TUSHNET, supra note 9. For further discussion of the populist nature of
Tushnet’s work, see generally Mark Graber, The Law Professor as Populist, 34 U.
RICH. L. REV. 373 (2000); Mark Graber, Thick and Thin: Interdisciplinary
Conversations on Populism, Law, Political Science, and Constitutional Change, 90
GEO. L.J. 233 (2001).
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promising institutional instrument for the development of this project
are self-limiting, organized social movements in the style of Gandhi,
Martin Luther King, and many others. These are movements
committed to principle, rational deliberation, experimentalism, and
nonviolence (the People are not always and everywhere so
committed). Like courts, they are instruments of a form of ambitious
moderation on which I elaborate below.
II. INSTITUTIONAL INSTRUMENTS
The project of the emerging global constitution is certainly a big
project. It is part of an even larger project of creating a universal
complex civilization. This is work with a long history and for the
long term. It is said that people routinely overestimate how much the
world can change in 5 years and routinely underestimate how much it
can change in 50 or 100 years (think how the world appeared in 1910
or even in 1960). So if the project of a global constitution seems
unrealistic, that may be simply because you are thinking short term.
Nonetheless, to make the project as realistic as possible, we need
more institutional instruments beyond the ones we have at hand.
Sovereign territorial states, especially the most powerful ones, will
resist. International organizations, established and controlled (to a
large degree) by states, are not likely to be reliable instruments.
But on the political horizon we can see something else. We can see
more than the chaos of initiatives from the bottom up, the global civil
society, or the global civic society as it should be called, since it is
the domain of multiple civic initiatives, each a potential embodiment
of the civic ideal. Domestic precedents suggest a more coordinated
institution could emerge from this chaos: a union (more than a
network, less than a federation) of self-limiting social movements
(human rights, environmental, civic renewal) pursuing their goals in a
Gandhian style.
If we are to be politically realistic about the global project of law,
with global constitutional law at its core, we should take as its
instrument not courts alone but an alliance of courts, constitutional
states, and self-limiting social movements, so the principles of the
global constitution must be formulated to be usable by courts,
officials of constitutional states, and self-limiting social movements.
Courts alone do not get very far with the moderate project and the
project of law. Only courts embedded in a broader institutional
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context (an alliance of institutions if you like) and embedded in an
intellectual context (a helpful understanding of law and moderation,
and a helpful disciplinary reorganization of the modern culture) can
take us much further.
An alliance with constitutional states is for courts old news. And it
is obviously problematic for the project of the law of the global
constitution. In that part of the project, states, even constitutional
states, play mostly (though not exclusively) the role of Madisonian
factions, each protecting and promoting its narrow interests above all,
little concerned with the global common good, or with universal
principles codified in law.
There must be more: some form of organized pressure from below,
some moderate equivalent of the revolutionary party of the Leninist
type. Nothing exists at the moment that fits the bill, certainly not the
open networks of organizations that go under the collective label of
global civic society (actually global civil society, but that is simply a
misnomer). But here too we have seen enough precedent, both
domestic and global, to be able to identify what could be a promising
instrument if it were created: a global union of self-limiting social
movements committed to impartial principle and taking human
destructiveness as the enemy. Gandhi is for them an exemplar. To be
substantively specific, the cause of moderation and hence of the
global constitution would be best served by a global union of three
kinds of social movements: movements for human rights,
environmental movements, and movements for civic renewal. I like
to call such a potential organization Global Solidarity.
III. LAW AS A PROJECT
Thus, the project of a global constitution and its law will be best
served by an alliance of courts, constitutional states, and a future
Global Solidarity. And the principles of a global constitution must be
usable by all three. They must have a legal expression to be usable by
courts. They must be usable by states outside courts and by
international organizations that are the products of states. But the
novel component is the third: they must also be usable in self-limiting
social movements.
The idea of law as a project is both familiar and obscure. It seems
both central to the practice of law and somehow external to it. It is
expressed in often-repeated phrases. In the common law tradition,
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nothing beats the words of Lord Mansfield: ―The common law that
works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for
that reason superior to an act of parliament.‖12 The claim of
superiority of common law to acts of parliament is now best
forgotten, but of common law Fuller still says: ―The common law
works itself pure and adapts itself to the needs of the new day.‖13
Ronald Dworkin opens his article Law’s Ambitions for Itself with
three formulations of the idea.14 In addition to ―[l]aw works itself
pure,‖ he writes, ―[t]here is a higher law, within and yet beyond
positive law, toward which positive law grows‖ and ―[l]aw has its
own ambition.‖15 These are mostly slogans aiming for a striking
phrase and a memorable metaphor. But the idea is widespread and
important, and it can be expressed more prosaically as Fuller does
when he tells us that law is ―the enterprise of subjecting human
conduct to the governance of rules.‖16 Similarly, Selznick has
identified the reduction of arbitrariness as the ideal of law.17
Law, one might say, is the project of building a community of
principle (Dworkin),18 a project of creating a world subject to public
reason (Kumm),19 or a project of the reduction of arbitrariness and the
expansion of the sphere of decision making constrained by the
impartial justification. But to stop there is to fail both to identify the
distinctive qualities of law and to articulate some of the important
ways in which law is worthy of our loyalties and sacrifices.
Law is not simply a project of subjecting human conduct to the
governance of rules. It is, if anything, a project that involves
balancing rules and principles. More generally, the process of
balancing multiple principles seems to be at the heart of law. If that is
12. Omychard v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23.
13. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 140 (1940). See also
FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 105 (2009).
14. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Ambitions for Itself, 71 VA. L. REV. 173, 173–74
(1985).
15. Id. at 173.
16. FULLER, supra note 1, at 106.
17. See generally PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE
(1969). For a more recent general presentation of Selznick’s views, see PHILIP
SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH (1992).
18. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 211, 213 14.
19. See generally Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism,
in RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey Dunoff & Joel Trachtman eds., 2009).
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true, then law cannot be seen as the application of one logically
coherent theory. So law does not maximize wealth.20 And law is not
fully captured, even in its most idealized form, by, say, a Rawlsian
theory of justice21 or a Dworkinian principle of equality.22 Balancing
and proportionality are at the heart of the rule of law,23 including
balancing between principles and rules.
But those who attempt to articulate what is distinctive about the
practice and the project of law by simply specifying its goal
(subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules) always seem
to end up with a picture of law fundamentally at odds with widely
perceived appearances. Somehow law is everywhere or almost
everywhere. For Fuller, law is everywhere human conduct is
subjected to rules, and that seems to take us a very large distance
away from lawyers’ law, or law as it is practiced in courts. It seems
more faithful to the inherited distinctions that govern our thinking
about law to define the project of law in a way that includes both
ends and means. For the project of law, courts are the central means.
And it matters that courts are instruments for the resolving of
conflicts; they are peace-making instruments. This suggests also a
third element in the goals of law: opposition to the power and effect
of human destructiveness.
I would put it this way: to understand law, we need to articulate a
larger moderate project, a form of moderation that is both
intellectually and politically ambitious. When we do so, we will be
able to see the project of law as serving moderation through courts.
The project of law is, I suggest, part of a larger moderate project of
institutional and political reform. Moderation (in the relevant sense)
has three pillars. Commitment to impartial principle (public reason)
20. See generally Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory,
8 J. LEG. STUD. 103 (1979). For a recent overview, see generally KLAUS MATHIS,
EFFICIENCY INSTEAD OF JUSTICE? (2009).
21. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 7; RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 7. For a later restatement, see RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS, supra note 7.
22. See generally Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part I: Equality of
Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?
Part II: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981); Ronald Dworkin,
What is Equality? Part III: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1987); Ronald
Dworkin, What is Equality? Part IV: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 1
(1987).
23. See DAVID BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159–88 (2004).
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or reduction of arbitrariness (and hence a certain kind of impartial
deliberation) is one of those pillars. The second is a commitment to
pluralism and diversity, hence also to attractive and harmonious
balances among principles. Harmonious balance, not coherence or
integrity, is on this view the master virtue of law. Complexity and
unity in diversity are among its attractive features. The third pillar of
moderation is opposition to human destructiveness. So some of the
principles we endorse guide improvement and creation, but others
diminish the power and effect of destructiveness. Peace is an ideal of
moderation, but so are freedom understood as diminishing the power
of coercion and order understood as increasing the predictability in
coercion.
IV. MODERATION
The project of moderation is not restricted to law. Law seems to
me best seen as that part of the larger project which uses courts as
instruments and hence elaborates rules and principles which courts
can use in the service of moderation. When we speak of law as a
system of rules and principles, we mean just that: these are rules and
principles which courts can use in the service of the project of
moderation, with its three pillars of commitment to public reason and
impartial rationality, diversity and pluralism (pluralism of ideals,
institutions, and creative projects), and a struggle against the power
and effect of human destructiveness.
These three pillars can be elaborated in multiple ways. Impartial
rationality requires a commitment to the giving of impartial reasons
for decisions and to the making of decisions based on impartial
reasons. But beyond that, rationality requires error prevention (and
hence various deliberative procedures) and error correction (and
hence something like Popper’s open society).24 It requires also a
social differentiation, a division of labor that Smithian economics
emphasizes, and a broader differentiation and specialization of the
normative structures, which we develop for the handling of different
issues: rationality requires what we might call an embedded
fragmentation of the institutions to handle the difficult problems,
requiring complex institutions and complex skills. Embedded
fragmentation of global law and global constitution is just one aspect
24. See KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th ed. 1966);
RALF DAHRENDORF, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN EUROPE (Transaction
2005) (1990).
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of this broader feature of what rationality requires.
The division of labor and differentiation that is both the featured
characteristic of Smithian argument for markets as instruments of
economic growth, and a featured characteristic of modernity
according to many sociological accounts, is only one kind of division
of labor. We might call it the division of labor into tasks. Rationality
also supports division of labor into stages, with its characteristic
requirement of the maintenance of continuity between stages in order
to be able to create over time. This form of division of labor is best
explained by citing a homely example familiar in an academic
setting. When we write papers, we divide our task into stages we call
drafts. Each draft is a draft of the whole paper (though it may be
incomplete). Thus we distinguish two kinds of divisions of a creative
project, such as a paper. We can separate a paper into parts and work
on each part separately. But we also divide the writing into stages.
The first draft of a paper, even if it is complete in that it includes all
parts, will typically mark the end of only the initial stages of the
work. There are likely to be many subsequent stages. This is not
Dworkin’s weird chain novel written one chapter at a time25 but
rather an all-but-universal pattern of large scale creation. We do not
simply begin with the first chapter; we begin rather with some sketch
of the whole, which we then fill in, usually (but not necessarily)
starting at the beginning. And as we proceed we also keep modifying
the overall plan. We work incrementally for the most part, although
occasional breakthroughs can rearrange the whole project. But even
then continuity must be maintained, unless of course we abandon the
project completely. So what has already been created constrains the
process of creation in the present.
Impartial rationality as we see from the above discussion imposes a
complex system of requirements. The second pillar of moderation,
the requirement of pluralism, is also complex. We need to keep in
mind at least three dimensions of pluralism. First, we insist on a
pluralism of projects. Some of these are projects for individuals, in
fact a project of self-creation, self-discovery, and self-cultivation for
each individual in the world. Others are shared projects, local or
universal, which are shared by a countless variety of cross-cutting
and over-lapping groups. Each such project can be thought of as a
little res publica within the boundaries of those who pursue it.
25. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 228–29.
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In a world dominated by the utilitarian style of thought and its
various aggregative cousins (such as cost-benefit analysis),26 it is
worth emphasizing that not all of these shared projects are
composites made up of smaller projects (in the way the utilitarian
goal is composed of individual goals). And when a project is a
composite, the elements need not be individual projects or
preferences. The most encompassing project is therefore best seen not
as the global pursuit of human welfare but rather as the development
of a universal moderate civilization, understood as composed of all
the projects of humanity consistent with moderation, and of their
products.
The second dimension of pluralism supports at any level and for
any project a plurality of principles, ideals, or legitimate interests.
This favors complex projects, aiming for various forms of
harmonious balance.
Finally, a third dimension of pluralism is one that supports contests
among different projects and among different conceptions of the
same project. Such contests are the best way to test the quality and
attractiveness of projects. We moderates support contests in the
economy (markets), contests in the polity (competitive elections),
contests in the realm of ideas, and contests in countless other realms
of human creative endeavor. Contests require a plurality of
contestants, without which improvement is hard to sustain.
Pluralism, like impartial rationality, imposes a complex system of
requirements. The same can be said of the third and final pillar of
moderation. The opposition to the power and effect of human
destructiveness is also complex. There are different ways in which
we try to defeat destruction. Three are familiar.27 Peace is an obvious
way to defeat destruction and destructiveness. Order (what Hayek
calls justice) and predictability (based on general rules) in state use of
violence allow us to avoid the destructiveness of the state. This is at
the heart of the classic form of Rechtsstaat and the importance of
26. For two good introductions to cost benefit analysis, see ANTHONY
BOARDMAN ET AL., COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE (2005);
E.J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2005). For an excellent
collection of critical discussions of cost benefit analysis, see generally Uri Gneezy
& Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).
27. Hayek writes of ―peace, freedom and justice: the three great negatives.‖
FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 130 (1979). By justice,
Hayek means something closer to order and predictability. Id.
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general rules in law.28 And we achieve freedom, understood as the
absence of coercion, to the extent we diminish the power of the
instruments of destruction.
If we are more aggressive in the war against destruction, we go
beyond any of these ends. We attempt to reverse destruction.
Renewal, rebirth, restoration, and renaissance are the most ambitious
ways to defeat destruction, stronger and more far-reaching than
peace, order, and freedom.
We now understand also, as increasingly we must, that human
destructiveness takes more forms than those traditionally recognized.
The moderate project, opposed to destructiveness in an advanced
industrial society, needs to recognize the destructiveness of human
economic activity. A certain kind of environmental concern must
become an integral element of our opposition to destructiveness. So
the contemporary moderate project will be necessarily also an
environmentalist project: it will see traditional constitutionalism and
a certain form of environmentalism as part of the same task.
The most ambitious goal of the struggle against destruction and
destructiveness is to reverse it, to destroy the effects of destruction. In
the post-Enlightenment age of the nineteenth century (certainly with
echoes into the twentieth), this took the form of reactionary politics
attempting to turn the clock back and return to the past. If we are
engaged in a battle between creation and destruction, this is not an
attractive proposition: it undoes the destruction as well as the
improvements.
The idea of a rebirth, or renewal or restoration, is more attractive.
It is not an attempt to go back into the past but to restore greater
continuity with the past. So when we restore an ecological system, an
urban neighborhood, or a whole city (as my home town Warsaw was
restored after World War II), you do not go back to the past. It is
better to put it this way: your aim is create what might have
developed (an ecosystem, a neighborhood, a city) if human
destructiveness had not intervened so massively. We have a choice
here: we are free to choose the most attractive form of what might
have developed. The river is restored to what it might have become,
and Old Town of Warsaw is restored to what it might have become as
well.
28. See generally FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960).
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V. UNDERSTANDING THE PROJECT OF LAW
How should we best understand the project of law? It is not enough
to understand it as the courts would understand it, though it is the
business of a lawyer to understand it that way if she is to be
successful. Why not? There is a simple answer: the project of law
cannot be sustained without support from outside the courts, and it
certainly cannot prosper without such support. We must consider the
project of law outside the courts, in some ways parallel to Mark
Tushnet’s populist constitutional law as a project of the U.S.
Constitution (the thin constitution) outside the courts.29
Judges’ understanding of law is in various ways restricted by the
distinctive tasks of courts in the project of law. For judges the
problem of motivation is diminished; they are paid to do what they
do. But the project of law in general depends on the work of people
whose incentives are not necessarily so well aligned with what will
make the project prosper. Motivation is a crucial issue.
Courts have a central but necessarily limited role in the project of
law. The precise nature of those limits is controversial and variable.
Its details differ in different legal systems and they evolve over time.
But it is a central function of courts to resolve disputes, for example.
If that is the business of the judge, then she needs an understanding of
the project of law sufficient to resolve the conflict before her, but not
more. Or to take another example, in broad areas of law there are
authoritative legal texts, and it is not the business of the courts to
change those texts. A judge needs to understand only the law as
written. So the work of law is largely a certain form of interpretation.
It is not the business of courts to change the text but to promote the
law within the text (so to speak).
Courts are the central institutional instrument of law as a project,
so this understanding of law from the courts’ perspective is
indispensable. But the project of law would never have gotten as far
as it has, and it could never develop further, if it operated only within
courts. A constitutional state with a balanced constitution, with both
autonomous courts and an executive willing to enforce what the
courts decide, obviously requires a larger political program, not just
law within the courts. Law cannot exist except as it serves the courts
and is served by them. But it would be nothing if it were limited to
29. TUSHNET, supra note 9, at 181.
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the courts. And a deeper development of the project of law on the
global scale requires an even broader understanding of the project of
law, just as it requires a broader range of institutional instruments.
If it is not enough to understand law as the judges should, what
then? There are no doubt many possibilities. I will pick from among
them one that reflects a larger normative commitment to strengthen
and improve human creative capacity. I will outline an understanding
of the project of law that is as helpful as possible to the project of
law. This effort is then part of a larger enterprise (a larger project, if
you can tolerate so much word repetition) of helping projects and
thus helping human creative capacity.
Since this way of formulating my goal is bound to bring to mind
Dworkin’s interpretive stance, with its slogan ―make it the best it can
be,‖ let me explain it more fully by way of contrast with Dworkin.
Dworkin contrasts two attitudes toward shared practices.30 We can
treat those practices ―as taboos,‖ as governed by fixed rules that need
only to be obeyed, no matter how arbitrary, not justified or
interpreted. Or we can take an interpretive attitude, in which our
fidelity to the practice involves also giving it the best possible
interpretation. The latter attitude may then also cause us to obey more
selectively and creatively in light of our interpretation of the practice.
There is a third alternative suggested at the end of Dworkin’s
Law’s Empire and in the various slogans I have presented above.31
Law can be taken as a project. Fidelity to a project requires more than
charitably interpreting a text or a text analogue. It requires
participation in a continuing process of creation, in a way that is as
helpful to that process as possible, which means preserving what is
being created, improving it, and more generally, bringing it closer to
completion.
Interpreting a text requires attributing to it a meaning that makes it
the best it can be. But the process of interpretation leaves the text
unchanged and attaches no significance to sequence and history. Not
so, if we consider law as a project. Nothing, then, about the law is to
be treated as finished, though each change must preserve the
continuity of the project. We experience law not as a judge
experiences the text of the law but more like the judge experiences
30. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 47.
31. See id. at 400–13.
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the constraint of the law in common law and, more generally, the way
you must experience any process of creation divided into stages and
occurring over time: the later stages must build on earlier stages;
creation now must be constrained by the process of creation that it
has inherited.
Interpretations of a text are to be evaluated on two dimensions: fit
and value. Understanding a project is best evaluated also on those
two dimensions but with two crucial modifications. We are not
restricted to changes in meaning, though we are constrained by the
requirements of continuity (hence the value of incrementalism and
precedent). And the dimension of fit is sensitive to sequence and
history. In identifying a project, we search for trends in history
worthy of articulating and extending into the future. These are the
projects we judge valuable. A project produces a trend, but the trend
may be noticeable only when the project is articulated. And the trend
is not inevitable: any project can be abandoned. Projects do not
constitute historical laws identifying an inevitable future. Projects are
simply distinct units of human creative power, extended over time, as
they must be to overcome the sheer difficulty of creation on a large
scale.
To understand a project in a way faithful to it requires therefore a
distinctive kind of historical analysis, an identification of trends, and
an articulation of their possible extension into the future. The trends
in question need not be linear, identifying a direction of progress and
moving in that direction. Large-scale creation through projects works
differently, as we see rather clearly when we look at creation in
science. The relevant pattern in science was first noted by T. S. Kuhn,
who described it as a sequence of periods of normal science and
scientific revolutions.32 It has since been more adequately described
by others.33 A scientific research program34 or a research tradition35 is
a sequence of scientific theories. Each successive theory builds on the
previous one. Each theory must be evaluated not in isolation but on
the basis of its place in the sequence and the value of the sequence as
a whole. A research program or tradition usually develops
32. See T.S. KUHN, STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
33. See, e.g., PETER GODFREY-SMITH, THEORY AND REALITY (2003).
34. See generally IMRE LAKATOS, THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH PROGRAMMES (1978).
35. See generally LARRY LAUDAN, PROGRESS AND ITS PROBLEMS: TOWARDS A
THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC GROWTH (1978).
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incrementally in what Kuhn has called ―normal science.‖36 But
sometimes it undergoes a radical transformation (a scientific
revolution), while maintaining a certain amount of continuity with the
past: Newtonian mechanics, for example, is preserved as a special
case of relativity theory.37 So, we have a kind of cycle: periods of
deep creative transition alternating with periods of incremental
growth, which tend to be more linear and predictable.
Ideas about how to make a shared practice the best it can be are a
part of what this understanding of a project requires, since a project is
a process of continuing creation and improvement. But a helpful
understanding of the project would also, for example, make it as
realistic as possible. This is usually taken to mean: make it small. I
think proper attention to the relevant problems of motivation suggests
something close to the opposite tack: make it a big project that can be
pursued in small steps.
VI. THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVATION
Large-scale human creative projects, as has been recognized in the
case of politics since at least the Axial Age of the various
civilizations, appear to have a choice. They can be organized in a
thoroughly hierarchical way and extend in this way the creative
power of the individual who is placed at the top of the hierarchy
through some effectively organized system of incentives, of rewards
and punishments. This is how the pyramids were built and how the
Qin empire was created in ancient China under legalist influence.
Alternatively (and this is the moderate alternative) they can
proceed in a more decentralized way, but they then face what modern
social science has called social dilemmas or problems of collective
action.38 At the heart of the decentralized form of large-scale human
creativity is then the problem of motivation. Markets provide one
solution to this problem, but it is widely recognized that they are not
a sufficient solution. The problem of motivation remains: how can we
36. KUHN, supra note 32, at 2.
37. See generally Kuhn, supra note 32. More precisely, Newtonian mechanics is
reformulated, making it an approximation to a special case of the new relativity
theory. Some people read into Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions radically
irrational claims that deny even this limited continuity in scientific revolutions. But
whatever Kuhn said or meant, this much continuity does exist.
38. See MANCUR OLSON, LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (rev. ed. 1971);
MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION (1987); ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990).
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motivate large numbers of people to sacrifice their narrow interest for
larger projects, even in settings where, if they do all sacrifice, they
will all be better off?
To generate motivation we should formulate the project in a way
that appeals to both the heart and the mind, so that the project
engages the passions as well as reason. Let me focus on one aspect of
the problem most directly relevant to the project of the global
constitution.
A good way to begin the discussion is with the Parable of the Two
Bricklayers. Those who are serious about promoting human creative
power like to repeat this parable. I have encountered it in the writing
of Harry Boyte, a key thinker in the contemporary American civic
renewal movement, and in the writings of Mikhail Gorbachev.39
Two bricklayers are working side by side building a wall. One
thinks he is building just a wall. The second sees himself as building
a cathedral. The second finds inspiration in his work and puts much
creative energy into it. For the first it is just a damn job.
The first bricklayer has an incompletely theorized approach to his
work.40 He might be concerned that, while there appears to be an
overlapping consensus41 on building a wall, others might have
different comprehensive theories of the cathedral, or the bricklayer
next to him might derive his commitment from the conviction that he
is building a brothel. But big projects inspire and motivate, and the
project of law badly needs inspiration.
39. Boyte and Kari write that:
―[p]ublic work‖ is work by ordinary people that builds and sustains our
basic public goods and resources—what used to be called ―our
commonwealth.‖ The story of the two bricklayers who were asked what
they were doing conveys this sense. One said, ―building a wall.‖ The other
said, ―building a cathedral.‖
HARRY C. BOYTE & NANCY N. KARI, BUILDING AMERICA: THE DEMOCRATIC
PROMISE OF PUBLIC WORK 16 (1996). Gorbachev’s version is more elaborate:
There is an old story: A traveler approached some people erecting a
structure and asked one by one: ―What is it you’re doing?‖ One replied
with irritation: ―Oh, look, from morning till night we carry these damn
stones . . . .‖ Another rose from his knees, straightened his shoulders and
said proudly: ―You see, it’s a temple we’re building!‖ So if you see this
lofty goal—a shining temple on a green hill—then the heaviest of stones
are light, the most exhausting work a pleasure.
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, PERESTROIKA 15–16 (rev. ed. 1987).
40. Cf. CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY 49–66 (2001).
41. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7.
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Contemporary political and legal theories, to which I allude in the
paragraph above, are preoccupied with the problem of disagreement
and suppress the elaboration of encompassing projects, because it is
difficult to agree on the nature of such projects. They do not seem to
be concerned with the problem of motivation. But the world will not
move unless and until people are motivated to move it. This exclusive
preoccupation with disagreement is a recipe for the betrayal of human
creative power. The problem of motivation is central, and it requires
the elaboration of large and encompassing projects. Yes, there will be
disagreements, but the bricklayers can build the wall, each with a
cathedral in mind, even if each bricklayer’s cathedral is different and
even if some think they are building a brothel. The bricklayers need
not agree on exactly what kind of grand and awesome structure they
are building; they need only sufficient overlapping consensus to
actually build the wall.
So the most helpful understanding of the project of law will
include, so to speak, guidance on the building of walls, but it will also
include a conception of the grand cathedral we are building. It will
allow us to contribute in micro-detail to the project of law, and it will
also allow us to see each small detail as part of some immense and
comprehensive project.
We will disagree with others about the nature of that project, but
we can agree on the details. And we can support each other as part of
the solidarity that connects builders of cathedrals (even different
cathedrals) as against those who only care about walls.
It appears that people have a powerful inclination toward
selfishness and short-sightedness. And human organizations do as
well. I believe we should give an account of the project of law that is
maximally helpful in diminishing this motivational problem. Hence,
among other things, we should present the project of law as part of
building a cathedral (or a very impressive brothel, if you prefer) and
not a wall.
VII. NEW MEDIEVALISM
What then is the big project that encompasses global law? Here is
the somewhat simple version of the answer I would propose. The
larger project is the creation of a complex and moderate universal
civilization, a universal civilization composed of less universal
civilizations, cultures, and multiple projects of human creative power,
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a world of human creation that is both diverse and unified. And
global law articulates those impartial and attractive principles of a
complex and universal civilization that are usable by the courts. This
is a big project, the most encompassing project of human creative
power. And it is a project with a long and dramatic history, with a
number of parallel civilizational paths (China, India, Islam, the West)
and dramatic crises and renaissances restoring continuity with the
past.
This immense project was in the past associated with the projects
of universal empire, empires aspiring to govern the entire civilized
world, as it then appeared, such as the Han empire of China or the
Roman empire. In the West, this project was revived in medieval
Europe by a dual system of Holy Roman Empire and Papacy, both
aspiring to civilizational universality. The project collapsed with the
religious divisions of Christendom and the political divisions
characteristic of the Westphalian system of sovereign territorial
states. But there are signs of its renaissance. Observing those signs,
many now talk of a ―new medievalism.‖
Scholars in international relations,42 international law,43
international political economy,44 and European Union studies,45
among others, have suggested that we may be witnessing on the
global scale, especially after the end of the Cold War, a return to
political and legal patterns characteristic of medieval Europe. Some
have advocated such changes, but of course only selectively and with
much modification. We can certainly find intriguing analogies
between contemporary developments and medieval history. But I
think there is more to this.
Those who invoke the analogy see the world, and Europe
42. See, e.g., HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 245–46, 254–66 (2d.
ed. 1995); Marek Cichocki, Nowe średniowiecze, 1(5) NOWA EUROPA 310, 310–29
(2007).
43. See, e.g., Paolo G. Carozza, My Friend Is a Stranger: The Death Penalty
and the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1036
(2003).
44. See, e.g., Stephen Kobrin, Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the
Postmodern Digital World Economy, 51 J. INT’L AFF. 361 (1998); Jörg Friedrichs,
The Meaning of New Medievalism, 7 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 475 (2001).
45. See, e.g., Peter Koslowski, Die Europäische Union und das Ende der
Einheit von Staatsvolk und Staat (International Centre for Economic Research,
Working Paper No. 11, 2004); Peter Koslowski, Unia Europejska a koniec jedności
narodu i państwa, 1(5) NOWA EUROPA 273 (2007).
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especially, as returning in some ways to the middle ages, to structures
of rule more like medieval Europe, with its Church, Holy Roman
Empire, universal values, and common law (Civil and Canon), but
also with its fragmentation and complexity, kingdoms and
principalities, cities and towns, leagues of cities and towns, law
merchant, manorial law, and so on.46
The locus classicus for the working out of this analogy in
international relations is the work of Hedley Bull.47 In more recent
political economy, the most substantial and interesting seems to me
an article by Kobrin.48 In international law, we see it invoked, for
example, by Carozza in his work on the law governing the death
penalty.49
What are we to make of this new medievalism? I think we should
take it seriously. These are not simply intriguing analogies. What
then? Are we in fact returning to the middle ages? Are we returning
to the Holy Roman Empire? In some ways the answer is obvious: no.
But I think there is a more interesting answer possible, identifying not
just a trend but a project worthy of our support, which does not
require us to go medieval but does indeed involve restoration of
continuity with the age before the Treaties of Westphalia (to use
those much abused treaties, once again, as a symbol).
We return in fact to a very ancient project with its roots, we might
say, in ancient Sumer, if not earlier. This is an effort to create a
complex universal civilization, with the project of a global
constitution as part of that larger project. So we can be seen as
restoring continuity with the effort in medieval Europe, which was
itself a restoration of continuity with the ancient effort, Roman in the
Western tradition, of building a universal complex civilization,
including its legal and political framework. And the analogies of new
medievalism can be elaborated into a distinctly non-Kantian view of
the project of global law, as part of a project of complex universal
civilization, in which there is room for fragmentation and pluralism
as well as universal principles and higher law.
A number of theoretical historians now see the Roman Empire as
46. See HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION (1983); HENDRIK SPRUYT,
THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS (1994).
47. BULL, supra note 42.
48. Kobrin, supra note 44.
49. Carozza, supra note 43, at 1036.
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just one among a number of such efforts rooted in what we might
call, after Jaspers, the axial transformation.50 The earlier efforts to
establish universal civilizations and Universal Empires were
religiously based (the Han Empire based on Confucianism, Asoka’s
empire based on Buddhism, the Islamic caliphate). And of course the
medieval European such effort was also religiously based, and it was
finally killed by religious divisions and religious wars. Those who
speak of a new middle ages do not propose to give new global
authority to the pope in Rome.51 But they both see trends and in some
cases (indeed, in my case) support those trends toward a return to the
project of a universal complex civilization, this time secular in form.
If we are to return to this project, then global law and the law of the
global constitution would be at its center.
So what may seem to be simply an intriguing analogy or a way of
using history to free our imaginations from the Westphalian prison
can also be seen as more than that. It can be seen as an inkling of
perhaps the largest of human creative projects, the project of building
a universal complex civilization, proceeding over millennia in fits
and starts in a pattern followed by all complex creation: a cycle that
begins with the slow articulation of a creative project, its flourishing,
crisis, and then renewal in modified form.
This is the grand and encompassing project of human creative
power guided by impartial principle and the many creative projects
which are its expression, including the project of law and the project
of moderation, with its most ambitious, cathedral-like goal of
building a universal civilization. Such a civilization would contain a
multiplicity of creative projects, each with some autonomy from the
others but also connected to the others in various ways. Each
individual life would count as a separate project, among others,
individual and collective.
These multiple projects would be cross-cutting and would generate
cross-cutting and multiple loyalties, with a complex system of crosscutting boundaries and conflicting ends. Territorial states would be
one type of project among many, one instrument through which
50. KARL JASPERS, THE ORIGIN AND GOAL OF HISTORY (1953). For the more
recent dramatic revival of the idea, see SHMUEL EISENSTADT, THE ORIGINS AND
DIVERSITY OF AXIAL AGE CIVILIZATIONS (1986); AXIAL CIVILIZATIONS AND
WORLD HISTORY (JOHANN ARNASON ET AL., EDS., 2005).
51. See supra notes 47–50.
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human creative power attempts to make the world better. But
territorial states would lose their dominance.
The political and legal foundation of such a civilization would look
more like the European Union than anything else that now exists. A
project needs exemplars (or paradigms), and the European Union can
serve as its exemplar. An exemplar is not to be slavishly copied, and
no one in his or her right mind would slavishly copy the EU. No, an
exemplar is supposed to be an aid to creative power, to suggest new
lines of development and new principles first only glimpsed through
trial and error and the kind of blind incrementalism that has been for
the most part the construction method of the EU.
In many ways the European Union looks more like the Holy
Roman Empire than like the modern nation state. So medieval and
renaissance institutions, as well as medieval and renaissance ideas,
are now again invoked as guides to our project of creation.
Althusius,52 the great theorist of the Holy Roman Empire, as we
might consider him, is now taken with new seriousness and used to
do intellectual battle against both Hobbes53 and Kant.54 And
Switzerland, which has preserved continuity with the Holy Roman
Empire more than any other state,55 emerges as a constitutional model
of consensual and consociational democracy in the influential work
of Arend Lijphart.56
By restoring continuity with the past we move forward in the
project of universal civilization; we enact another stage in the
sequence of renewals Peter Koslowski identifies as drivers of the
European civilization.57 They are not exclusively European, however.
Through a sequence of rebirths and renewals, a modern stage of the
project of universal civilization is slowly articulated. So we do not
return to the middle ages but move forward to the next stage of
52. See JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA (Liberty Fund 1997) (1614).
53. See THOMAS HUEGLIN, EARLY MODERN CONCEPTS FOR A LATE MODERN
WORLD (1999).
54. See JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 125 (2003) (―[A] theory of global
civil society needs less Kant and more Althusius.‖).
55. For a good discussion of the Swiss case, see JONATHAN STEINBERG, WHY
SWITZERLAND? (1996).
56. AREND LIJPHART, PATTERN OF DEMOCRACY (1999); AREND LIJPHART,
THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY (2008). See Brendan O’Leary, Debating
Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments, in FROM POWER
SHARING TO DEMOCRACY 3 43 (Sid Noel ed., 2005).
57. Koslowski, supra note 45.
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modernity, slowly freeing ourselves from its Enlightenment-era
constraints and distortions. And the new stage of modernity restores
continuity with the project of building a polycentric universal
civilization, which in Europe was itself an attempt to restore
continuity with ancient Rome.
I think this may be a good context, the largest context also, for
considering the project of the global constitution and its law.
VIII. GLOBAL CONSTITUTION
If we are going to restore continuity with the medieval project, we
should perhaps also try not to be imprisoned by the eighteenth
century idea of what a constitution is. A constitution need not come
in the format of a sovereign act by a sovereign people. We can learn
much yet from the British constitution, which maintained continuity
(and restored it after it was broken) with its own medieval projects of
law.58
The global constitution is a project, or better, multiple projects. It
is the most ambitious and encompassing formulation of the project of
law. A constitution as a project is not to be identified with the
character of a political system or a structure of power, whatever it
might be. Stalin’s Soviet Union was a political system with a
distinctive set of characteristics (e.g., the leading role of the MarxistLeninist Party and state ownership of the means of production), but it
had no constitution. Of course, the propaganda documents with the
title Constitution of the USSR were not the constitution either.59 On
58. John McEldowney writes of the United Kingdom’s constitution that
―[c]ontinuity is seen as one of [its] self-perpetuating features . . . .‖ Memorandum
by Professor John McEldowney, University of Warwick, para. 21 (Sept. 8, 2003)
[hereinafter McEldowney Memorandum] available at http://www.parliament.thestationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldconst/168/16809.htm#note92
(―address[ing] the [e]ffects of the proposed European Constitution on the
constitution of the United Kingdom‖). And he continues:
The absence of a single or codified constitution leaves the working out of
the practicalities of the constitution to the system of laws, conventions and
customs that are the hallmark of the medieval inheritance. A notable feature
is the use of conventions . . . that comprise the common practices and
workings of government that link the modern with the ancient, medieval
constitution.
Id. para. 2.3.
59. They were mostly fiction and propaganda, with a few facts added. See
generally THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE USSR AND THE UNION REPUBLICS:
ANALYSIS, TEXTS, REPORTS (F. J. M. Feldbrugge ed., 1979).
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the other hand, Britain does have a constitution.60 And we can
perfectly well understand the claim of the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen that without separation of powers there is
no constitution.61
What then is the project of constitution or, for that matter, what is a
constitution? It is a project with an intimate connection to the project
of law. So let me propose this: a structure of power has a constitution
to the extent it is committed to the project of moderation, with some
form of a plurality of impartial principles and some of those
principles expressing in various ways opposition to the power and
effect of human destructive capacity. The commitment can be
expressed in legal form, in the form of a law of the constitution that
has superior authority and that is hard to amend. But more deeply it
must be a political commitment.
Understood in this way, a constitution has a necessary connection
to law and the project of law, but it has no necessary connection to
the state. And when understood in this way the most ambitious form
of constitution is a global constitution, a global commitment to the
project of moderation.
So what would a global constitution look like? It would not be an
act of a ―We the People‖ but a realm of principle emerging in a
sequence of creative acts on a path from a system of ―law made
consensually between states.‖62 It would also not be a liberal project.
It is a project, so it is not yet in existence. But it can be discovered
in trends we can identify and in what appears just over the horizon.
Since it is a project, it does not have a unique possible future. That
future will emerge, if it emerges at all (being a project, it might not),
out of a contest among various possible conceptions of that future. If
60. See McEldowney Memorandum, supra note 58. For a classic source, see A.
V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1915). For a contemporary textbook, see COLIN TURPIN & ADAM TOMKINS,
BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007).
61. Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen art. 16 (Fr. 1789) (―A society
in which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers
defined, has no constitution at all.‖), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/do
cid/3ae6b52410.html.
62. The University of Maryland School of Law—International & Comparative
Law Symposium, Multilateralism and Global Law: Evolving Conceptions of
International Law and Governance, http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/confer
ences/detail.html?conf=86 (last visited May 14, 2010) (description of conference).
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a constitution is a commitment to moderation, then this project is one
in which we develop the legal forms of a global commitment to
moderation, those forms which are usable by the courts.
Constitutionalization is a process in which we diminish the influence
of human destructiveness and enhance the influence of impartial
principles. It requires as such neither a state nor a demos.
Let me present a sketch of moderate cosmopolitan
constitutionalism and its conception of a global constitution by way
of contrast with the closest available alternative, or at least the closest
alternative I am familiar with, Mattias Kumm’s ―paradigm of
cosmopolitan constitutionalism,‖ which he develops in opposition to
what he calls the paradigm of statist constitutionalism.63
Both paradigms are presented as accounts of law as it is (though in
a Dworkinian spirit), and Kumm argues that the cosmopolitan
paradigm is simply a better account, on the dimensions of both fit and
value.64 He writes:
Cosmopolitan constitutionalism does not just articulate an
ideal. The argument here is a legal argument . . . . It is not a
political program . . . . The correct paradigm is the one that
best fits legal practice. All conceptual paradigms trying to
reconstruct legal practice from an internal point of view
necessarily have an idealizing element that complements the
conventional element.65
Kumm’s footnote here is to Dworkin’s Law’s Empire,66 and the
reference is not to its last chapter, with its effort to articulate
something closer to the project of law.67
Cosmopolitan constitutionalism is a
jurisprudential account claiming to describe the deep structure
of public law as it is . . . [and whose] central claim is that a
cosmopolitan paradigm is better able than a statist paradigm to
make sense of contemporary public law practice, to provide a
63. Kumm, supra note 19, at 258–324.
64. Id. Interpretations must fit the legal facts, and justify them as much as
possible, in accordance with what is also known as the principle of charity in
interpretation. The slogan is: ―make it the best it can be.‖
65. Id. at 311.
66. Id. at 311 n.106.
67. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 400–13.
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plausible reconstructive account that both fits that practice and
shows it in the best light.68
Kumm summarizes the contrast between the two paradigms most
succinctly when he writes:
Instead of ―We the People,‖ statehood and sovereignty as the
foundations of a practice of constitutional law that imagines
itself as focused on the interpretation of one text, diverse legal
materials are identified, structured and interpreted in light of
principles that lie at the heart of the modern tradition of
constitutionalism. Ultimate authority is vested not in ―We, the
People‖ either nationally or globally, but in the principles of
constitutionalism.69
These central principles of constitutionalism for Kumm are: the
principle of legality, the jurisdictional principles of subsidiarity, the
principle of due process, and the principle of human rights and
reasonableness.70
When Kumm elaborates the last of these principles, he provides us
with another succinct formulation of the contrast between his two
paradigms: ―Within the statist paradigm . . . constitutional rights are
rights whose authority is traced back to the will of the national
constitutional legislator . . . . The cosmopolitan conception, on the
other hand, takes as basic a commitment to rights-based public
reason . . . .‖71
Since my aim is to articulate an alternative form of cosmopolitan
constitutionalism, let me call Kumm’s version ―rights based‖ and
contrast it with a ―moderate‖ alternative, which is also concerned
with contributing to the project of human creative power and not
simply to a codification of existing legal practice from the internal
point of view.
If we see law, particularly constitutional law, as a project, we will
be less concerned than Kumm with the question whether the statist or
the cosmopolitan paradigm provides the best fit to legal practice. Law
is now, as always, in transition. The best fit to legal practice would be
obtained if we admit as much. For the purposes of the project of
68.
69.
70.
71.

Kumm, supra note 19, at 262.
Id. at 271–72.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 304–05.
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cosmopolitan constitutionalism, current practice can be best
accounted for as part of a transition from the statist to a cosmopolitan
paradigm, inevitably containing elements of both. And our task is to
articulate the cosmopolitan paradigm not as an account of the deep
structure of law as it is and not simply as a political ideal, but as a
project of law, integrated with a larger political ideal and with larger,
moderate, political institutional complexes and moderate political
practice.
The moderate conception of cosmopolitan constitutionalism can be
best presented when we reformulate slightly Kumm’s contrast. The
moderate cosmopolitan constitutionalism is best contrasted with an
eighteenth century paradigm, in which the core moderate
commitments of constitutionalism are constrained and distorted in at
least three ways: by the Westphalian and statist constraints to be sure,
but also by the distinctive context of eighteenth century revolutions
(in the name of ―We the People‖), and by a one-sided preoccupation
with rights, a preoccupation backed by social contract theory. The
eighteenth century framework is statist, revolutionary, and rightscentered.
The moderate cosmopolitan alternative preserves and modifies the
sovereign territorial states, subjecting them more thoroughly to
universal principle. It preserves and modifies the revolutionary
tradition, eliminating the (Cartesian?) idea of a grand moment of
creation by the People ex nihilo, and restoring the old idea of a
revolution as renewal and rebirth. And finally, it preserves and
modifies the commitment to universal human rights by combining it
with universal human responsibilities. In all three dimensions (and
we could add more) the contrast is between an eighteenth century
paradigm of constitutionalism (or an Enlightenment paradigm, if you
prefer) and a moderate cosmopolitan paradigm, designed for the next
stage of the modern transformation (the post-Enlightenment stage).
This moderate cosmopolitan alternative is addressed not just to
courts (though it certainly needs to be addressed to courts) but to
multiple institutional audiences, notably to an emerging self-limiting
global social movement, which needs to be part of this project, if the
project is to move forward. The fundamental principles of this project
must be fundamental principles of the project of moderation in its
current stage, not simply principles of constitutionalism. They must
be capable of formulation in a manner that appeals to courts, and
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hence to lawyers, but also to a broad civic movement.
A moderate alternative, addressed in this way to both courts and
the people organized in self-limiting social movements might build a
global constitution around five principles: (1) the principle of
universal human rights, codified into a distinctive, moderate,
conception of global justice, which incorporates a commitment to
democracy and to due process; (2) the principle of universal human
responsibility; (3) the principle of unity in diversity, as an expression
of the moderate commitment to pluralism; (4) the principle of
subsidiarity, as a reflection of both the principle of equal human
dignity and the commitment to pluralism; and (5) the principle of the
effective pursuit of the goals of humanity.
We could see this constitution as establishing a union of semiautonomous and cross-cutting republics of a new kind (more on this
below), subject to universal principles: a principle of universal human
rights which we can codify into an account of global justice and a
principle of universal human responsibility.
Global justice would not build on the contractarian idea
(elaborated by Rawls, but with roots in the social contract theories of
the Enlightenment) of fair terms of social cooperation among free and
equal citizens. It builds instead on an idea that emerges from the hard
experience of the twentieth century: the equal inviolability of human
dignity.72 Fair terms of social cooperation leave us cold. But when the
German nation commits itself for eternity to the proposition that
human dignity is inviolable,73 we are moved to tears.
IX. A UNION OF REPUBLICS
Consider first the components of a global constitution designed for
a complex universal civilization. I have called them republics. These
republics are not (necessarily) states. They are bounded domains
within which distinctive impartial principles, distinctive public ends
and purposes, and distinctive interpretations of universal principles
can be articulated. In the Westphalian system, it was natural to think
only of territorial states as republics. But even in the Westphalian
72. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, pmbl., U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.s
html.
73. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1(1) (F.R.G.) (―Human dignity is
inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.‖).
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system it would have been good to think of corporations as potential
republics as well.
In fact, if we allow for incomplete autonomy, we can see a great
multitude of republics-in-the making across the world. And what we
need as part of this project of global constitution, which is a form of
the project of globalization, is not the elimination of boundaries. If
anything, we need additional boundaries to create and sustain the
autonomy, which the multiple inchoate republics need in order to
develop. We need boundaries of different types. Some are territorial
boundaries, corresponding to contemporary territorial states, regional
―unidentified political objects‖ (such as the European Union),
provinces and localities within states, or regions across boundaries of
states (as these are defined in EU, for example). Some are boundaries
between groups of people (say those who speak French, those who
speak Flemish, and those who speak German, if you are in Belgium).
And some are boundaries between issue areas, distinguishing what
we have come to call regimes (a trade regime, a health care regime, a
climate regime, and so on).
In a system of multiple and cross-cutting republics, there will be
multiple and cross-cutting boundaries. A complex civilization
requires such a system; it requires a fragmented law. But as we
constitutionalize a union of republics, these boundaries will cease to
be (over time) set by the balance of military force in past wars, or
dynastic arrangements in a long forgotten past, or past calculations of
how to establish stable peace. They will be less arbitrary and less
preoccupied with the power of human destructiveness. They will be
more principled than the territorial boundaries we inherit. They will
also be less vague than the regime and sub-regime boundaries we
inherit. The problem of fragmentation in international law is not so
much a problem of fragmentation itself (after all, federal systems are
also systems of fragmented law). It is rather a problem of the absence
of well defined and principled boundaries, separating what ought to
be the semi-autonomous legal systems, or what I have called the
semi-autonomous republics.
Not any boundary will do. It should be precise enough to allow
within-republic consistency. It should be flexible enough to allow
easy change as the situation changes. The principle of flexibility is
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important in the European Union. Schengen,74 the Euro zone,75 and
the multiple other derogations and exceptions in effect create many
different kinds of boundaries within the EU. The boundary’s location
should be determined by impartial principle. Boundary setting by
referenda is a good case in point, best exemplified by the
establishment of the Swiss Canton Jura,76 and less well exemplified
by various boundary setting referenda in the immediate aftermath of
World War I. Finally, this system of overlapping republics should
have boundaries which are limited by principles determining who can
cross, what goods can cross, which legal cases can cross, and so on.
The project will thus preserve and enhance complexity and hence
boundaries. But not arbitrary boundaries. They will be set in
principled ways. Their power as boundaries will be limited by
principle, and they will be flexible. Vague inter-regime boundaries
will be made more precise, as is being done all the time, perhaps
most explicitly by various courts and court-like institutions. There is
nothing incoherent about complexity and fragmentation if the
boundaries are not vague and if unifying principles exist.
This union of semi-autonomous and cross-cutting republics in the
slowly emerging global constitution enacts the principle of unity in
diversity. The diversity is protected by the principle of subsidiarity.
The unity is provided by two universal substantive principles. A
principle of universal human rights has been a visible part of the
emerging global constitution for some time. If we are to formulate
this constitution in a way usable by social movements as well as
courts, we can plausibly now attempt to articulate it more fully into a
conception of justice based on human dignity, in a format that lends
itself to comparison with, say, Rawls’s conception of justice (or other
philosophical conceptions).77
The basic principle of global justice that might emerge from a
codification of the emerging human rights practice would be nothing
like Rawls’ fair terms of social cooperation among free and equal
citizens. Human dignity would necessarily be the featured idea, so we
74. See generally Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, June 14,
1985, 30 I.L.M. 73.
75. See CHRISTIAN N. CHABOT, UNDERSTANDING THE EURO: THE CLEAR AND
CONCISE GUIDE TO THE NEW TRANS-EUROPEAN ECONOMY 25, 175–76 (1999).
76. STEINBERG, supra note 55.
77. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 7; MARTHA NUSSBAUM,
FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE (2006).
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might suggest a principle of the equal inviolability of human dignity
(or more simply, in the German manner: human dignity is inviolable).
Most philosophical theories of justice, not just Rawls, simply
marginalize human dignity.78 Those that do not (such as Nussbaum)
identify the dimensions of human dignity in a manner that bears no
relation to the emerging practice of human rights. On various
occasions, Nussbaum has listed ten conditions (not always the same
ten) necessary for a life worthy of human dignity.79 Her lists are not
supported by legal practice, nor could they be.
But a different set of dimensions of human dignity does emerge
from legal practice. It arguably constitutes that ideal of global justice
which is part of the project of the global constitution.
Clapham, drawing on legal sources, has identified at least four
aspects of the concern for dignity:
(1) the prohibition of all types of inhuman treatment,
humiliation, or degradation; (2) the assurance of possibility for
individual choice and the conditions for each individual’s selffulfillment, autonomy, and self-realization; (3) the recognition
that the protection of group identity and culture may be
essential for the protection of personal dignity; and (4) the
creation of necessary conditions for each individual to have
their essential needs satisfied.80
So we have four dimensions of human dignity: a prohibition of
degrading and cruel treatment; a requirement of equal respect,
demanding individual liberties and civil and political rights;
protection of what gives human lives meaning and purpose (religion
and nation, for example); and an economic and social guarantee.
Each of these dimensions of human dignity is capable of a distinct
articulation, codification, and formalization. Each deserves its own
distinct limitation clause. The priority among the dimensions can be
expressed through these limitations clauses, avoiding the awkward
choice between two seemingly unacceptable alternatives: no
78. Among those who marginalize human dignity, one can cite all the main
representatives of the contemporary contractarian tradition, John Rawls prominent
among them, and all the main representatives of the Lockean traditions, such as
Robert Nozick. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
79. NUSSBAUM, supra note 77, at 76–78.
80. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS
545–46 (2006).
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priorities at all or lexical priority of the kind Rawls proposes.
This ideal of justice is in no way contractarian. The core idea is the
inviolability of human dignity. And this core idea is elaborated not by
considering in more detail the meaning of human dignity in general
and the history of the concept’s use.81 Nor is it elaborated, as in
Nussbaum’s theory, by some independent consideration of what is
necessary for a life worthy of human dignity.82 There is a real project
of human rights in place; its elaboration proceeds through legal and
political deliberation and struggle. The theoretical task is to expand
on the articulation and codification that are occurring as part of this
deliberation and struggle. The work of lawyers and political
movements seems here more significant than the work of
philosophers.
Rawls’s theory of justice83 and Dworkin’s theory of equal concern
and respect84 recognize only two of these four dimensions. They have
no room for the distinctive treatment of cruel and degrading treatment
or hence for the distinctive evil of torture and genocide. They also
have no room for the protection of what gives human life meaning
and of groups that are carriers of what gives life meaning: cultures,
religions and national traditions. Arguably, the recognition of the four
dimensions, rather than the two in Rawls and Dworkin, marks our
moderate conception as more inclusive than the mainstream liberal
theory of justice. The contrast with mainstream liberalism goes
further.
A moderate conception of the global constitution can be
uncompromising in its commitment to universal human rights and an
ideal of global justice that codifies human rights. But it can also be
equally uncompromising in its commitment to universal human
responsibility. Liberal conceptions are likely to be reticent on this
second front. To the extent this is true, liberal conceptions of global
constitution are bound to be unbalanced and incomplete. The
principle of universal human responsibility, I would argue, is just
emerging on the global horizon, mostly in the rather specialized
context of environmental concerns, with nothing like the history of
81. See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, Tanner Lectures,
University of California at Berkeley (Apr. 21, 2009).
82. See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 77.
83. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 7.
84. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272–73 (1977).
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the principle of universal human rights and hence without the
elaboration, codification, and legal standing.
It emerges as such in the Earth Charter,85 where the distinctive
concern is with sustainability and protecting the ecological integrity
of the Earth. Or we can use the principle of ―common but
differentiated responsibility‖86 taken from the climate regime (and
applied there to states), but which can be reformulated more broadly.
The Earth Charter is a declaration first suggested in the Brundlandt
Report’s call for a ―universal declaration‖ and a ―new charter.‖87 The
1992 Earth Summit in Rio failed to agree on any such charter, so it
became an initiative of what we like to call the global civil society,
developed under the leadership of Maurice Strong and Mikhail
Gorbachev. No other document has generated so much support from
below across the globe. But it has limited support from states; it is not
even soft law.
Law, however, can emerge also from human interaction,88 and
from below. If law is a project, and global law its most ambitious
formulation, then the principles of the Earth Charter may tell us
something about where this project is aiming.
We must join together,‖ the Earth Charter proclaims in its
Preamble,
to bring forth a sustainable global society founded on respect
for nature, universal human rights, economic justice an a
culture of peace. . . . To realize these aspirations, we must
decide to live with the sense of universal responsibility,
identifying ourselves with the whole Earth community, as well
as our local communities. We are at once citizens of different
nations and of one world . . . .89
85. The
Earth
Charter
Initiative,
The
Earth
Charter,
http://www.earthcharterinaction.org/invent/images/uploads/echarter_english.pdf
(last visited Apr. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Earth Charter].
86. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development princ. 7, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (―In view of the different contributions to global environmental
degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities . . . .‖).
87. See KLAUS BOSSELMAN, THE PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABILITY 2 (2008).
88. See Lon Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, in THE PRINCIPLES OF
SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON FULLER (Kenneth Winston ed., 1981).
89. Earth Charter, supra note 85, pmbl.
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One way to understand the Earth Charter is to see it, with Klaus
Bosselman, as articulating above all a principle of sustainability. 90
But there is another way, which connects environmental concerns
that inevitably dominate the principle of sustainability with a broader
ethic of responsibility: we are citizens of one world.
So one can perhaps say this: the principle of universal human
rights expresses the conception of justice contained in the global
constitution. The principle of universal human responsibility
expresses a conception of a civic ideal contained in the global
constitution, as it is now emerging just over the horizon of law.
X. CONCLUSION
The dominance of the West may be one reason why our
articulation of the global constitution is unbalanced in favor of human
rights. Other civilizations (the Confucian tradition comes to mind)
have preserved more fully a concern with responsibilities. The project
of law, according to the moderate conception, culminates in a
moderate global constitution—not anti-liberal, but not simply liberal
either.
It will be91, it ought to be, a constitution that balances rights and
responsibilities, and one that anticipates the renewal of non-western
civilizations, such as the Confucian one. In its rights-based
conception of global justice it will recognize at least four dimensions
of human dignity, and hence also—perhaps especially—the
significance of what gives meaning to human lives. It will support
and express the complexity of a universal civilization, itself unique,
but also protecting and enhancing the uniqueness of its component
parts. It will be a constitution whose principles reflect an engagement
in the struggle against the power and effect of human destructiveness.
And, finally, it will be a constitution, whose principles are formulated
as law, for the use of courts, but also as principles for the guidance of
self-limiting social movements, struggling in the service of the
moderate project.

90. See generally BOSSELMAN, supra note 87.
91. This is not a prediction of the future (see the first paragraph of this paper). It
is an effort to articulate a moderate form of the project of a global constitution.

